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Alvin Plantinga (1932–) is one of the most important figures in the rebirth of old-
fashioned, a priori, metaphysics in the late 20th century and early 21st century.  
Along with others such as Saul KRIPKE (1980), he was instrumental in 
persuading philosophers that Quinean naturalism was not the only option in 
terms of a metaphysical worldview.  Furthermore, he has been the principal force 
behind an enormous flowering of orthodox Christian (and, more generally, 
theistic) belief among analytic philosophers.  When Plantinga wrote his first book, 
God and Other Minds in 1967, theism was thought of as quaint at best, and 
intellectually sloppy and dishonest at worst.  Yet, by the end of the 20th century, 
the Society of Christian Philosophers had become an extremely large and active 
subgroup of the American Philosophical Association.  In what follows, I will 
provide an overview of Plantinga’s body of work in metaphysics, including the 
philosophy of religion, abstract ontology, and the metaphysics of modality. 
I. God 
Alvin Plantinga believes that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, 
omnibenevolent being--GOD--who cares about human beings and interacts in 
human history  (see Plantinga 19, and 1998, and for a discussion of the scope of 
God's knowledge, see Plantinga's 1993 exchange with Grim ).  This being in 
some way grounds or explains the existence of everything that exists, perhaps 
even necessarily existing entities such as propositions, properties, relations, 
states of affairs, and possible worlds (Plantinga 1980; for further discussion of 
these issues see Morris, 1987, Davidson, 2006, and Bergmann and Brower, 
2006).  Plantinga thinks that a version of the ontological argument is sound (see 
Plantinga, 1990, ch. 2, 1974a, ch. X, and 1974b, pp. 85 ff.).  His discussion of the 
ontological argument is the most subtle and important since the discussion of the 
argument during the Modern period.  Interestingly, Plantinga thinks that although 
the argument is sound, he does not think it is cogent:  He does not think that the 
premises will convince anyone who does not already believe the conclusion of 
the argument. 
Important for Plantinga's famous FREE WILL defense against the logical 
problem of evil (Plantinga 1974a) is that God has middle knowledge:  God knows 
what libertarian-free creatures would do were counterfactual circumstances in 
which they exist actual (this locution will be discussed momentarily).  This 
assumption in Plantinga's argument has revived a hearty debate from the 
sixteenth century between Luis De Molina and his Dominican opponents about 
the nature of God's knowledge (e.g. , see Hasker, 1989, Flint 1998, Hasker 2004, 
and Molina 2004).  The thought that there is nothing to know about what 
libertarian-free creatures would do in non-actual circumstances has raised 
questions about whether there is anything for God to know with respect to what 
libertarian-free creatures will do (in the actual world). 
Plantinga also argues that belief in naturalism is "self-defeating" in that 
anyone who accepts it is irrational in her belief that it is true.  He also argues, 
even more provocatively, that anyone who accepts it is thereafter irrational in 
everything she believes.  This irrationality arises because the naturalist believes 
(or most every naturalist believes) that our cognitive faculties were shaped by 
mindless evolutionary forces that select for traits that foster reproductive fitness, 
and there conceivably are many ways whereby our cognitive mechanisms could 
be flawed with respect to producing true beliefs and still be selected for (or 
selected) by evolutionary forces.  Plantinga (1993, 1994, 1998, 2002) provides 
rigorous argumentation for the proposition that belief in naturalism is self-
defeating, and Beilby (2002) contains responses to Plantinga's provocative 
argument. 
2. Actualism and Modality 
Plantinga is a staunch proponent of actualism, as Plantinga puts it, the 
view that there neither are nor could have been objects that don't exist (see 
Plantinga, 1985).   Furthermore, Plantinga defends serious actualism, the view 
that objects have properties only in POSSIBLE WORLDS where they exist 
(Plantinga 1985).  In other words, necessarily, an object o has a property only if o 
exists (for a discussion of actualism, see Adams, 1981 and Fitch, 1996, for a 
discussion of serious actualism, see Bergmann, 1999). 
One of the factors that enabled the current flowering of metaphysics is the 
acceptance of de re modality.  Many philosophers for much of the middle of the 
20th century accepted QUINE’S arguments (1960) that de re MODALITY is an 
incoherent notion; many believed that "modality resides in the way we talk about 
objects, not in the objects themselves."  More than anyone else, Plantinga 
showed that Quine's arguments for this claim weren't convincing (see in 
particular Plantinga, 1969 and 1974a).  With the shift to thinking that objects have 
modal properties (tied to things like identity conditions) independently of the way 
we think or talk about them, philosophers began to ask what sorts of modal 
properties objects have.  Could Socrates have been an alligator?  Could this cup 
lose its handle and persist? 
3. Possible Worlds and Essences 
As mentioned above, Plantinga believes in states of affairs, abstract 
objects which are ways things are or could have been (see PROPOSITION, 
STATES OF AFFAIRS).  They are denoted by phrases like "Socrates's being 
snubnosed."  Many states of affairs are actual, e.g. The United States's being 
engaged in a preemptively-launched war, many are not, e.g., Iraq's having 
weapons of mass destruction.  Some of those that aren't actual couldn't be 
actual, e.g. Cheney's simultaneously being and not being Vice President of the 
United States of America.  Some states affairs which are actual now, won't be 
later, e.g., George W. Bush's being President of the United States of America.  A 
close relative of this state of affairs which always was and will be actual is 
George W. Bush's being President of the United States of America in 2006.  
Plantinga calls states of affairs which are actual at every time, if actual at all, non-
transient states of affairs.  All other states of affairs are transient (Plantinga 
1985).  For Plantinga, all of these states of affairs exist necessarily. 
Plantinga also defines relations between states of affairs (see Plantinga, 
1970 and 1974a).  A state of affairs S includes a state of affairs S' if and only if 
necessarily it's not possible for S to be actual (or obtain) and S' not obtain.  A 
state of affairs S precludes a state of affairs S' if and only if necessarily it's not 
possible that S and S' obtain.  A possible world for Plantinga is a maximal non-
transient state of affairs, a non-transient state of affairs that includes or precludes 
every state of affairs (Plantinga 1985).  One possible world is actual, or obtains.  
An individual x exists in a world W just in case W's being actual entails that x 
exists.  A proposition p is true in a world W just in case W's being actual entails 
that p is true.   
Plantinga also believes there are individual essences (see Plantinga, 
1979).  An individual essence E of an object o is a property such that, 
necessarily, if E is exemplified, o exists, and necessarily, if o exists, E is 
exemplified.  There are broadly two sorts of individual essences for Plantinga, 
haecceities and world-indexed essences.  A HAECCEITY is a "primitive" sort of 
individual essence, denoted by a phrase like "being Socrates", or "being identical 
with Socrates" (see Rosenkrantz, 1993).  A world-indexed individual essence is a 
property like being the President of the United States in 2006 in insert Greek 
alpha here where "insert Greek alpha here" is a name of the actual world.  The 
property being the President of the United States in 2006 is possessed "uniquely" 
by one individual: if an individual exemplifies that property at any time, then that 
individual is George W. Bush.    
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